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Immigrant Perceptions of the "War on
Terror*
Elizabeth Heger Boyle & Fortunata Ghati Songora**
Introduction
Ultimately, the meaning of law emerges from the interaction
of law in the abstract, law in practical application, and law as the
public perceives it.1 This Article focuses on the last category: the
general assumptions and perceptions made about the law by
ordinary individuals. We interviewed members of an immigrant
community affected by the legal reforms resulting from the war on
terror to find out how they perceived those legal reforms. Every
immigrant we asked told us that September 11, 2001, changed the
situation of immigrants. Few mentioned specific statutory reforms
or legal cases. None of the immigrants made distinctions between
state and federal law, and some greatly exaggerated the
government's abuses of immigrants after the terrorist attacks. In
short, the immigrants we talked to were not very knowledgeable
about most details of the United States government's war on
terror. Given the lack of knowledge about specific legal reforms,
* This project was made possible with funding from the National Science
Foundation, Grant No. SES 0099145, and from the Life Course Center at the
University of Minnesota. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or Life Course
Center. The authors would like to thank Erika Busse, GUlseren Isik, and Yasin
Garad for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. As other authors in this
symposium have explained, the "war on terror" is not really a war at all. We use
the term because of its common public usage, not because we concur with its
implications. For ease of reading, however, we put the term in quotes only in the
title. As an additional note, the interviews cited below were conducted upon
assurances of confidentiality, and no names have been provided or are known
except to the authors. All interviews are on file with the authors. [Editors' note: in
the interest of confidentiality, no interview transcripts were provided to Law and
Inequality for review]
** Elizabeth Heger Boyle is Associate Professor of Sociology and Law at the
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Fortunata Ghati Songora is a Ph.D. student
in the Sociology Department at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
1. See A. JAVIER TREVIi o, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw: CLAsSIcAL AND
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVEs 6-8 (1996).
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the disjuncture between new immigration laws on the books and
the legal consciousness of immigrants is a critically important
issue. 2 Lawyers often speak of positive or negative reactions to
law, motivations sparked by law, the chilling effect of law, and
myriad other forms of personal behavior and attitudes resulting
from law.3 Yet the degree to which such behavior and attitudes
truly exist is rarely studied. 4
As social scientists, we are interested in how law becomes
"institutionalized," that is, how it becomes a part of everyday life. 5
The war on terror is in the process of being institutionalized in the
United States because the U.S. public believes that the war exists
and should exist, at least to some extent.6
2. See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (describing the "social construction of
legality" as the interactions between individuals and law that shape both law and
individuals' perceptions of law).
3. See, e.g., Alison Holland, Across the Border and Over the Line: Congress's
Attack on Criminal Aliens and the Judiciary under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 400 n. 118 (2000); Geoffrey Rapp,
The Economics of Shootouts: Does the Passage of Capital Punishment Laws Protect
or Endanger Police Officers?, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1051, 1057-58 (2002); Laura I.
Weintraub, Academic Privilege and Title VII: The Birth, Death, and Possible
Rebirth Of An Evidentiary Privilege, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 313, 335
(2000).
4. See Rapp, supra note 3, at 1053-54 (providing needed empirical data that the
death penalty produces behavioral effects).
5. See ELIZABETH HEGER BOYLE, FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING: CULTURAL
CONFLICT IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 9-16 (2002). See generally Elisabeth S.
Clemens & James M. Cook, Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability
and Change 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 441 (1999) (analyzing political and social
"institutionalisms" and how they change); Lauren Edelman et al., The Endogeneity
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406
(1999) (describing how courts institutionalize emerging organizational practices in
markets); John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J.
SOC. 144 (1997) (analyzing how world culture institutionalizes nation-states,
including their legal authority).
6. See BOYLE, supra note 5, at 7-10. Institutionalization is a multi-layered
process. Different groups have differing levels of knowledge of and control over
particular legal policies. See Ronald Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects,
and Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
143, 148-52 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); see also Michel
Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in UNTYING THE TEXT: A POST-STRUCTURALIST
READER 48, 52-55 (Robert Young ed., 1981). Consequently, the aspects of a policy
these groups take for granted and their expectations about policy enactment and
reform also differ. In general, professionals understand how to work within or
around policies, and also how to modify policies they find unsatisfactory. See, e.g.,
Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Popular Legal Culture: Lawyers and Legal
Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1664
(1989). Those with less expertise are more likely to sense policies as autonomous
from themselves, and as indiscriminate or arbitrary. See JOHN SUTTON,
LAw/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND CHANGE 6 (2001).
IMMIGRANT PERCEPTIONS
Legislators and lawyers are likely to know the details of the
specific laws and regulations that constitute the war on terror,
recognize the interconnections between these laws, and can
explain the purposes attributed to the laws. 7 These "experts" can
also distinguish laws that make up the war on terror from
unrelated laws and events. Thus, it is within their power to blur
the distinctions between laws and maintain high levels of
flexibility in applying those laws.8 The general public, in contrast,
is distanced from the technical details of the war.9 People know
that a war on terror exists, the overriding motivations behind it,
and a few key stories related to it.10 However, they are less likely
to know the precise terminology of the legal reforms or to be able
to clearly identify what is and what is not a part of the war on
terror.11 Most immigrants are also unaware of the specific nature
of the legal reforms, but are in a distinctive position: the war
affects them more directly than other groups in the general
public. 12 They are troubled by ambiguities concerning the war on
terror,1 3 how to maintain legal status, 14 and the definitions of
"terrorist" and "immigrant."15
Many of the immigrants we interviewed had adopted a
number of strategies to bolster their sense of security in the
current environment.1 6 Many of the interviewees had tried to
avoid the vagaries of the war on terror by seeking citizenship.1 7
7. See generally Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 6 (providing an assessment of the
special knowledge of lawyers and other experts with regard to law in general).
8. See Kitty Calavita, Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global
Economy: Notes from Spain, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 529, 544-45 (1998) (describing
interpretation of immigration laws by administrative authorities).
9. See generally Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 6 (providing an assessment of the
special knowledge of lawyers and other experts with regard to law in general).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., IMBALANCE OF POWERS: How CHANGES
TO U.S. LAW & POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(2003), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/loss/imbalance/powers.pdf.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 147-162; see generally Regina Germain,
Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act for
Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 506-07 (2002) (describing concerns
regarding seeking asylum, deportation, and being labeled as a suspected terrorist).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 184-191; see generally Germain, supra
note 14, at 506-17 (describing past and present definitions and providing
examples).
16. See infra notes 119-215.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 128-132; see generally Germain, supra
note 14, at 522-23 (describing how non-citizens are subject to detention and
certification requirements of the PATRIOT Act).
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Most of the immigrants we interviewed are not actively mobilizing
to change laws that negatively impact them,1 8 but fortunately,
some immigrants have remained politically active. 19 Specifically,
we find that of the immigrants we interviewed, those on
permanent visas or with more education are more politically
active. 20 Also, some issues spur more activism than others. For
instance, East Africans we interviewed were very outspoken about
police misconduct but mobilized less around bureaucratic
slowdowns and overbroad deportation measures. 21 This may be
because citizenship, the apparent strategy of choice for dealing
with U.S. law, provides little protection from police discrimination
but does allow immigrants to avoid other ills. By appreciating the
unique perspectives of immigrants in the multi-layered process of
institutionalizing the war on terror, policymakers can minimize
the war's collateral damage to immigrant groups.
The first section of the Article describes the general
characteristics of the East African communities in Minneapolis
and St. Paul, Minnesota (hereinafter the "Twin Cities").22 The
second section explains the methods through which we recruited
and interviewed members of those communities. 23 In the third
section, we explore East Africans' perceptions of law and
enforcement in the post-9/11 United States. 24 The analysis in this
section is purposely broad-it includes some events that experts
would not consider related to the government's war on terror. Our
choice of what to include was driven by the immigrants
themselves. Our primary concern was to identify the connections
they perceived between particular events and the war on terror or
September l1th. Finally, the Article concludes with policy
recommendations that, by addressing immigrant concerns about
the war on terror, would increase the legitimacy of that war and
keep it focused on its true purpose--preventing terrorism.
25
18. See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 133-162 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 208-215
and accompanying text.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 26-73.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 74-92.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 93-258.
25. See infra text accompanying note 259.
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I. East Africans Immigrated to the Twin Cities for a
Better Life
African immigration to the United States was minimal
during most of the twentieth century, but increased notably
beginning in the mid- to late 1980s.26 Prior to that time, only
individuals from relatively privileged backgrounds were able to
come to the United States, most often as students. 27 Minnesota
has been a particularly common site for secondary migration 28 for
individuals coming from Africa. 29 The 2000 Census data for the
state of Minnesota estimate that approximately 11,000 Somalis
live in Minnesota. 30 The highest concentration of East Africans in
the state of Minnesota is in the Twin Cities.31 Somalis are the
largest East African group, 32 followed by Ethiopians (numbering
approximately 5,000). 3 3  Other East African nationalities
represented in the Twin Cities are Oromos, Eritreans, and
26. See Tanya Kateri Hernandez, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in
the Structure of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731, 749 (1997)
(describing increase in number of immigrants of color). See also Joseph Takougang,
Recent African Immigrants to the United States: A Historical Perspective, 19 W. J.
BLACK STUD. 50, 51-52 (1995); Enid Trucios-Haynes, The Legacy of Racially
Restrictive Immigration Laws and Policies and the Construction of the American
National Identity, 76 OR. L. REV. 369, 369-71 (1997); Interview 031 with 45-year-
old Ethiopian man, Associate Degree, citizen, in Minneapolis, Minn. (May 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Interview 031].
27. See, e.g., OROMO CMTY. OF MINN., HOW THE OROMO CAME TO MINNESOTA 2
(2000); see also Takougang, supra note 26, at 51.
28. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINN. EDUC. FUND, IMMIGRATION IN
MINNESOTA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2002). The term "secondary
migration" describes instances in which immigrants enter a country at one location
but move to another after some time. See id.
29. See id. at 5; MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., HISTORICAL HIGH NUMBER OF
IMMIGRANTS MOVE TO MINNESOTA IN 2002 (2003), available at
http://server.admin.state.mn.us/resource.html?Id=4298 (last visited Jan. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter HISTORICAL HIGH NUMBER]. See also Interview 037 with 50 year-old
Somali woman, Associate Degree, permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept.
20, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 037]; Interview 020 with 28 year-old Somali man,
Professional Degree, permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Apr. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Interview 020].
30. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINN. EDUC. FUND, supra note 28, at 10.
Census data from 2000 indicates Minnesota's total African-born population is
around 34,500. See A World in Two Cities: Africans and African Music in the Twin
Cities (last updated June 30, 2002) (last visited Jan. 30, 2004), at
http://www.cla.umn.edu/twocities/rprojs/eastafrica/ea-index.asp [hereinafter A
World in Two Cities].
31. See A World in Two Cities, supra note 30.
32. See Barbara Ronningen, Immigration Trends in Minnesota, MINN. STATE
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Sudanese, as well as Tanzanians, Kenyans, and Ugandans. 34 The
impact of the war on terror is especially significant for these
groups of immigrants. First, most East Africans have not acquired
citizenship and its related protections. 35  Second, like the
September 11th terrorists, 36 many of these immigrants are
Muslim.3 7  For these reasons, these individuals have been
particularly affected by the war on terror.
As noted, the largest group of East African immigrants in the
Twin Cities is the Somalis.38 From our interviews, we determined
that the first wave of Somali refugees and asylees came in the
early to mid-1990s, when political difficulties in Somalia began to
mount. 39 These individuals tended to belong to the Somali middle
34. See MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED BY COUNTRY OF
BIRTH AND INTENDED STATE OF RESIDENCE (Aug. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.demography.state.mn.us/DownloadFiles/Immigration2002/Immigrants
ByCountry.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Immigrants by Country of
Birth]. Importantly, "East Africans" include a diverse array of political, cultural
and historical legacies. In many cases, the outpouring of refugees and asylees from
this region stemmed from postcolonial, Cold War and/or post-Cold War
international politics. For example, Somalia, because of its geopolitical position,
was viewed as a key Cold War site by both the United States and the former Soviet
Union. Similarly, Eritrea was awarded to Ethiopia when colonial powers moved
out of the Horn of Africa following the Second World War. At the same time,
colonial powers shifted control over parts of what was formerly Somalia to Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Consequently, Somalia has fought with these countries
over the years in an effort to reclaim these lost provinces. These conflicts
ultimately resulted in high numbers of refugees. Civil and border wars have
resulted in collapsing infrastructure in these countries, which in turn has led to
extended periods of famine in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and the Sudan, and in the
complete collapse of the Somali state. See generally ABDISALAM M. ISSA-SALWE,
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOMALI STATE 130-47 (1996) (describing United Nations
involvement in Somalia and the country's recent political and economic
disintegration); HAROLD WOODS & GERALDINE WOODS, THE HORN OF AFRICA:
ETHIOPIA, SUDAN, SOMALIA, AND DJIBOUTI 15-23 (1981) (describing recent political
and economic troubles in the Horn of Africa).
35. See infra note 84 and accompanying table (showing that only 18% of our
diverse sample of East Africans had acquired citizenship, although nearly all were
interested in acquiring it eventually).
36. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, A Terrorist Profile Emerges that Confounds the
Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A2.
37. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINN. EDUC. FUND, supra note 28, at 10
(noting that 99.9% of all Somalis are Sunni Muslim, and citing statistics showing a
large number of Somalis in Minnesota).
38. See Ronningen, supra note 32, at Slide 14. Most Somalis in the Twin Cities
are single, between twenty and forty years of age, and because many men were
killed in the war, the typical family is headed by a woman. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF MINN. EDUC. FUND, supra note 28, at 10.
39. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINN. EDUC. FUND, supra note 28, at 10.
See also Interview 406 by Sadie Pendaz with refugee case manager from Catholic
Charities in Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 406.]
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class and came mostly from the country's urban areas. 40 Most had
some formal education and could recall the time in their country's
history when government institutions were still functioning.
41
They knew how to read and write, but typically in a Somali
dialect, Arabic, or Italian rather than in English. 42 Our interview
subjects also informed us that the largest group of Somalis arrived
in Minnesota within the last eight years, as refugees and asylees.
43
This group included Somalia's rural poor, who bore the brunt of
the war-torn country's failing infrastructure. 44 These refugees
were generally illiterate and unable to speak English upon
arrival.45
A long-time resident of the Twin Cities from Ethiopia
explained the history of Ethiopian migration to us. 46 He indicated
that Ethiopian immigration began in the 1980s.4 7 A large number
of Ethiopians were granted refugee or asylee status through Cold
War immigration policies favoring immigrants fleeing state
socialism. 48  More recently, many Ethiopians have taken
advantage of the diversity lottery,49 a program that grants visas to
citizens of countries that have been historically underrepresented
in immigration to the United States. 50 Some Ethiopians also came
to the United States on student visas and ultimately decided to
stay rather than return to the tumultuous political and economic
conditions back home. 51
Oromos constitute a major ethnic group within Ethiopia, and
often do not identify themselves as ethnically Ethiopian. 52 Many




44. Interview with Kent Mortimer, General Manager, Afton Hills Apartments (a
subsidized housing complex that leases predominantly to East Africans), in St.
Paul, Minn. (July 13, 2000). See also Interview 406, supra note 39.
45. Interview with Kent Mortimer, supra note 44. See also Interview 406, supra
note 39.





51. Id. See also Interview 024 with 20-year-old Ethiopian man, high school,
permanent resident, in Duluth, Minn. (May 6, 2002).
52. Abiyu Gelata, The Plight of the Oromo People in Ethiopia (2002), (on file with
the author). See also Interview 003 with 35-year-old Oromo man, M.A., permanent
resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Interview 003];
Interview 004 with 45-year-old Oromo man, Ph.D., citizen, in Minneapolis, Minn.
(Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Interview 004]; Interview 007 with 35-year-old Oromo
man, B.A., permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 07, 2001) [hereinafter
2004]
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Oromos immigrated to the Twin Cities to escape political and
ethnic persecution by the Ethiopian government. 53 Since 1943,
Oromos have been fighting for independence from Ethiopia
through the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).54 Persecution is
mainly targeted at Oromo intellectuals and leaders who are
viewed as sympathetic to the OLF,55 which may explain in part
why many Oromo immigrants are more highly educated than the
other East Africans we interviewed. 56
Until 1991, Eritrea was part of Ethiopia. 57 Like the Oromo,
many Eritreans considered themselves colonized by Ethiopia.56
The United Nations federated Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1950, and
Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea as a province ten years later
sparked a thirty-year struggle for independence. 59 The revolution
ended in 1991 with Eritrean rebels defeating government forces.
60
Eritrean independence was overwhelmingly approved in a 1993
national referendum. 6 1 As a consequence of the war with Ethiopia,
many Eritreans fled the country as refugees and asylees to the
United States and other countries. 62  Most Eritreans we
interviewed came as refugees, and many of the Eritrean men had
been guerrilla fighters during the war.63
According to the immigrants we spoke with, the number of
Sudanese in the Twin Cities is relatively small.64 They indicated
Interview 007].
53. Mirjana Lausevic, Africans and African Music in the Twin Cities: A World in
Two Cities (2002), available at
http://www.cla.umn.edu/twocities/rprojs/eastafrica/ea-index.asp (last visited Jan.
30, 2004).
54. HUM. RTS. WATCH, ETHIOPIA: HALT CRACKDOWN ON OROMO STUDENTS
(2002), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/ethiopiaO52202.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2004).
55. Id. See also Geleta, supra note 52.
56. We interviewed seven Oromos; all but one had some college education. One
had a doctorate degree and two had masters degrees.
57. ERITREA CMTY. CTR. IN MINN., HISTORY OF ERITREA (2001), available at
http://www.nitesoft.com/eccm/history.htm [hereinafter ECCA].
58. AFRICANET, ETHIOPIA HISTORY (1997), at
http://www.africanet.com/africanet/country/ethiopia/history.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2004).
59. ECCA, supra note 57.
60. Id.; DAVID POOL, FROM GUERRILLAS TO GOVERNMENT: THE ERITREAN
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT 161 (2001).
61. ECCA, supra note 57.
62. Interview 102 with 48-year-old Eritrean man, high school education, citizen,
in Minneapolis, Minn. (June 24, 2001) [hereinafter Interview 102]; Interview 103
with 35-year-old Oromo man, B.S., citizen, in Minneapolis, Minn. (June 30, 2003)
[hereinafter Interview 103].
63. Interview 102, supra note 62; Interview 103, supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., Interview 101 with 35-year-old Oromo man, M.A., permanent
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that Sudanese immigrants came to the United States primarily in
search of religious and political freedom. 65 After almost forty
years of civil war, Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir became
president in 1989 following a military coup backed by the National
Islamic Front. 66 Subsequently, many Sudanese Christians sought
refuge outside of the Sudan.67 The vast majority6 of participants
in this study from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Sudan plan
to remain permanently in the United States, mostly because they
feel that they cannot go home, and a number have already become
naturalized citizens. 69
Our interviewees informed us that in contrast to the refugees
and asylees from the Horn of Africa, most immigrants from Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda came as students or through the diversity
lottery.70 Individuals from these countries do not generally come
to the United States to flee political persecution or civil unrest, but
are more typically motivated by economic and educational
opportunities. 71  Immigrants from these countries tend to be
highly educated in comparison to refugees from the Horn of Africa.
Out of our total sample of ninety-three, only seven individuals
plan to return permanently to their countries of origin.7 2 Five of
the seven students interviewed would like to remain in the United
States, so these individuals should not necessarily be considered
temporary visitors. 73
resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Interview 101].
65. Id.
66. Horn of Africa News Agency, Country Profile: Sudan (2000), at
http://www.hananews.org/wholearticle.asp?artId=709 (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
67. Interview 101, supra note 64.
68. Forty-eight of the fifty Somalis we have interviewed, seventeen of the
nineteen Ethiopians, and all of the Eritreans plan to stay in the United States
permanently. One Sudanese man, who is a U.S. citizen, is hoping to go back and
help rebuild his community if the situation in Sudan improves.
69. Seventeen of the interview subjects have already been naturalized.
70. Interview 006 with 27-year-old Tanzanian woman, M.A., permanent resident,
(translated from Swahili) in Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
Interview 006]; Interview 705 with 30-year-old Tanzanian woman, M.A., student
visa, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 705]. All of the
Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Ugandans in our sample were students, spouses of
students, or professionals.
71. See, e.g., Interview 006, supra note 70; Interview 705, supra note 70.
72. See supra note 68.
73. See generally Takougang, supra note 26.
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II. Interviews were Conducted with East Africans to Learn
Their Thoughts on Changes in the Law since September
11th
We conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with
ninety-three East African immigrants in the Twin Cities between
September, 2001 and November, 2003 to assess their perceptions
of the war on terror.74  Interviews of this type provide an
opportunity to "give voice" to a population that is marginalized
along several axes of inequality, such as race, income, English
proficiency, and citizenship status. 75
A. Recruitment of the Interviewees
A multi-faceted recruitment strategy was necessary to draw a
sample that reflected the diversity of the East African community
in the Twin Cities. 78 The nationality of our interviewees, although
not exactly parallel to the total population, approximates those
numbers. 77 The table provides an overview of the characteristics
of our sample.78 Fifty of the interview subjects (54%) are Somali.79
Nineteen (24%) are from Ethiopia.80 Among the individuals from
Ethiopia, seven are ethnically Oromo (8% of the total sample),
eleven are ethnically Amharic (12% of the total sample), and one
was ethnically mixed (1%). We also interviewed nine Eritreans
(12%), eight Tanzanians (9%), three Sudanese (3%), one Ugandan
(1%), and three Kenyans (3%).81
Our sample includes forty men (48%) and forty-eight women
74. This is part of a larger study considering the effect of gender and nationality
on citizenship decisions among East African immigrants.
75. See generally CHARLES RAGIN, CONSTRUCTING SocIAL RESEARCH (1994).
76. In devising a sampling strategy, we attempted to represent the full contours
of the East African population in the Twin Cities. Respondents were recruited at
conferences and community meetings. We also visited East African neighborhoods
and enclaves, recruiting through English as a Second Language classes, community
centers, and immigrant-owned/operated stores and shopping malls. Respondents
were also recruited through personal networks.
77. A multitude of ethnic groups and clans create specific ethnic groupings in
East Africa, such that within any one country, up to several dozen separate ethnic
groups may coexist. With the exception of the Ethiopians (who are identified as
Oromos or Amharics), we only provide data on nationality. We made this decision
because it would not be possible to generalize about each of the large number of
possible ethnic affiliations in our sample.
78. See infra note 85 and the accompanying data table.
79. Due to shifting borders created by colonial powers, our sample also includes
three individuals who are ethnically Somali, but have Kenyan citizenship; these
individuals are classified as Somali.
80. See infra note 85 and accompanying data table.
81. See infra note 85 and accompanying data table.
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(52%).82 Most of our interview subjects were Muslim (58%),
followed by Christians (39%).83 Forty-one interviewees (44%) were
single, twenty-eight (30%) were married, six (6%) were divorced,
eight were separated (9%), and four (4%) were widowed and not
remarried.8 4  The average age of our interview subjects was
twenty-seven years old. In terms of class, the table includes data
on educational attainment and visa status, both rough measures of
class. In our sample, 50% of interviewees had at least a college
degree, while 15% had less than a high school degree.
Immigration status correlates with class and education, as
individuals with asylee status, or who come to the United States
through the diversity lottery, are usually more highly educated
and have higher incomes in their countries of origin than refugees.

























82. See infra note 85 and accompanying data table.
83. See infra note 85 and accompanying data table.
84. See infra note 85 and accompanying data table.
85. The data for Table 1 is a compilation of demographic information of the
respondents of this survey.
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Variable Value
Education



















*Values do not always add up to 93 because some respondents did not
answer all the questions. Percentages do not always add up to 100 because of this
and rounding.
B. Interview Technique
The use of semi-structured interviews allowed us to
encourage respondents to address issues that they felt were
important.8 6 Although structured questions were used to guide
the interviews, the discussions could take any form, and follow-up
questions were used to explore ideas not covered in our set of
questions. By treating the interview process and the interview
guide as fluid,8 7 we were able to incorporate participants' ideas
and suggestions into the research process. In the initial
86. See generally HERBERT J. RUBIN & IRENE S. RUBIN, QUALITATIVE
INTERVIEWING: THE ART OF HEARING DATA (1995). Rather than treating
participants as passive subjects, we encouraged participants to tell stories that
they thought were especially significant. To this end, interviewers emphasized the
conversational nature of the interviews, allowing deviations from leading questions
when appropriate.
87. We also revised the questions during the course of the study to incorporate
new themes that had emerged in recent interviews. The order of questions was
rotated in different interviews to ensure that ordering did not influence how people
responded to questions. At the end of each interview, interviewees were asked if
there was anything else they would like to share, and many interviewees responded
enthusiastically with more information.
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interviews, we simply asked general questions about law and
politics. We found that many of the interview subjects specifically
mentioned how life had changed for their communities after the
2001 terrorist attacks.88 As a consequence, we added more specific
questions about this in the later interviews.
Fortunata Songora, a Ph.D. student from Tanzania,
conducted most of the interviews with assistance from three
Somali undergraduates.8 9 Interviews were conducted in English,
Somali, or Swahili. The interviews generally lasted one to two
hours and respondents were asked open-ended questions in six
general areas: law, citizenship, political participation, religion,
family status and relationships, and race relations. All of the
interviews were tape-recorded, 90 transcribed, and translated into
English, if necessary. 91 Interviewees were also asked to complete
a brief demographic questionnaire. We promised interview
subjects anonymity to encourage them to speak freely without fear
of reprisals. 92
III. The PATRIOT Act Ushered in a New World of Terror for
East African Immigrants
Shortly after the September 11th terrorist attacks, United
States President George W. Bush declared a war on terror.
93
Although Bush has repeatedly stated that the war on terror is not
a war on immigrants, 94 collateral damage to refugees and asylees
88. Interview 038 with 51-year-old Somali woman, no formal education, refugee,
in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 038].
89. The two undergraduate male interviewers were Ahmed Ali and Yasin Garad;
the undergraduate female interviewer was Idil Mohamed. Ali and Garad are
United States citizens; Songora and Mohamed are not. Elizabeth Boyle, a professor
at the University of Minnesota, and Sadie Pendaz, a Ph.D. student-both born in
the United States-also conducted some of the interviews.
90. On four occasions, interviewees requested that the interviewer temporarily
turn off the tape recorder to discuss sensitive issues.
91. In addition, a small number of interviews were conducted in English with a
Somali translator present. The translator's interpretations of interviewee's
responses were transcribed in these cases.
92. Rather than using the name of interview subjects in our citations, we refer to
them by number and also provide their nationality, age, gender, educational
attainment, and immigration status.
93. Bush's Remarks to Cabinet and Advisors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A16.
For commentary on the connection between the war on terror and immigration, see
generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We the People After September 11,
66 ALB. L. REV. 413 (2003); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History
in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003); Germain, supra note
14.
94. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 12, at 27. Compare id., e.g.,
with LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., infra note 136.
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is irrefutable. 95 Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act on October 26, 2001.96 The
PATRIOT Act had a direct effect on immigrant communities. 97 In
particular, the PATRIOT Act expanded the offenses for which
immigrants could be deported. The PATRIOT Act labeled as a
deportable offense the provision of material support for groups
that the State Department had designated "terrorist
organizations" even for humanitarian projects. 98 The Act also
makes it a deportable offense to materially aid a group that a
person "knows, or reasonably should know promotes terrorist
activity," even if the donee is not on the State Department's list of
known terrorist organizations. 99
A. East Africans Worry about Their Tenuous Position in
the Wake of September 11th
The East African immigrants that we interviewed differed
greatly in their level of knowledge about the war on terror.100
Many perceived U.S. law as sweeping and indiscriminate, and
viewed the operation of immigration law as largely outside of their
95. Id. See also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on
Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1028 (2002); Michael M. Hethmon,
Diversity, Mass Immigration, and National Security After 9/11-An Immigration
Reform Movement Perspective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 387, 409 (2003); Michael J.
Wishnie, Introduction: Immigration and Federalism, 58 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283,
284 (2002).
96. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
97. See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Megan
Peitzke, The Fate of "Unremovable" Aliens Before and After September 11, 2001:
The Supreme Court's Presumptive Six-Month Limit to Post-Removal-Period
Detention, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2003); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose
Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the
Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 (2002); Natsu Taylor
Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11? American Jurisprudence
Confronts The Rule Of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2002); Rita Shulman, USA
Patriot Act: Granting the U.S. Government the Unprecedented Power to Circumvent
American Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security, 80 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 427 (2003); Shirin Sinnar, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory
Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (2003); Marie
A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding the Civil
Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 63 (2002).
98. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 411 (2001), amending 8
U.S.C. §1182.
99. See id.




control. Most of the immigrants we spoke to had very specific
thoughts on how the United States' response to the terrorist
attacks was affecting them personally-for example, in the form of
delays in family unification and changes in immigration status. 0 1
We were informed that in response to changes after September
11th, many immigrants attempted to obtain citizenship to gain
more control over their futures in the face of a new regime for
immigration and homeland security. 10 2
The legal consequences of the war on terror and the
PATRIOT Act, while serious in and of themselves, gave way to
exaggerated rumors within the East African community. For
example, one woman told us:
Since September lth, there is almost ten thousand Somali
refugees who are not U.S. citizens in jail-prison. They are
denied the same rights that American people enjoy. I mean,
American citizen would not be imprisoned or deported for like
a simple thing like parking ticket or stuff like that .... In
Minnesota alone, there [are] thousands of Somali people, both
men and women, who are in prison. 0 3
These perceptions of the law, however inaccurate or exaggerated,
and not the specific purposes of the law, ultimately influence East
African reactions to the war on terror.
B. Immigrants Rank Deportation as Their Number One
Fear after Several High Profile Deportation Cases
Target Somalis in the Twin Cities.
The highly publicized deportation of Somali immigrants after
September 1 th created fear among many of the immigrants with
whom we spoke. On February 14, 2002, for example, the United
States government deported thirty individuals to Somalia,
including ten individuals from Minnesota. 0 4 A Star Tribune
report raised concerns about the fate of deportees returned to
Somalia because locals believed them to be U.S. agents. 0 5 One
101. See, e.g., Interview 039 with 44-year-old Somali woman, B.A., asylee, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 039].
102. See, e.g., Interview 104 with 19-year-old Eritrean woman, high school,
asylee, in St. Paul, Minn. (July 12, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 104].
103. Interview 311 by Ahmed Ali with 22-year-old Somali woman, high school,
citizen, (translated from Somali) in Minneapolis, Minn. (June 23, 2003) [hereinafter
Interview 311]. Throughout this Article, we have used direct quotes and
occasionally added words in brackets to clarify meaning rather than the use of [sic]
to indicate a grammatical error.
104. Lourdes Medrano Leslie & Eric Black, 10 Minnesota Somalis deported; Five
others could be sent back, STAR TRIB., Mar. 7, 2002, at 8A. Eight of the ten
deportees were convicted felons. See id.
105. Id.
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Somali interview subject mentioned the killing of one deportee; 0 6
others expressed concern about the safety of the deported
Somalis. 0 7 Two weeks before these deportations, on February 1,
2002, a U.S. magistrate ruled that Keyse Jama, a 22-year-old
Minnesota resident who pled guilty to a 1999 assault, could not be
deported to Somalia because the country had no government.10 8
Jama's case then went before a U.S. district judge in Minneapolis,
who concurred with the magistrate's finding in March 2002.109 In
May 2003, a three-judge panel from the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the lower court finding in Jama, holding in a
two-to-one decision that Jama's deportation was permissible." 0
Nevertheless, the district court finding in the Jama case laid
the groundwork for a Seattle class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of
potential Somali deportees."' In that case, the district court judge
issued a stay on all Somali deportations until the case was
resolved. 1 2 That stay applies to the deportation of Omar Jamal,
an outspoken Twin Cities activist." 3 In September 2003, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the stay imposed by the
Seattle district court." 4 The contradictory rulings in the Eighth
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals may ultimately be resolved by
the Supreme Court." 5
106. Interview 704 with 25-year-old Somali man, some college, citizen, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 7041.
107. Interview 032 with 22-year-old Somali man, high school, permanent
resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (July 10, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 032];
Interview 046 by Idil Mohamed with 52-year-old Somali woman, elementary school,
permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn., Oct. 10, 2002, [hereinafter Interview
0461; Interview 311, supra note 103.
108. Kavita Kumar & Erik Black, Somali can be deported, U.S. Appeals Court
rules: Ruling applies to 1 case but it could affect others, STAR TRIB., May 28, 2003,
at 3B.
109. Jama v. INS, No. CIV.01-1172 2002 WL 507046, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 31,
2002).
110. Jama v., INS, 329 F.3d 630, 635 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Kumar & Black,
supra note 108, at 3B.
111. Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390 (D. Wash. 2003). Both the global linking of
economies and "the growth of a broad network of rights and court decisions along
with the emergence of immigrants as political actors, have reduced the autonomy of
the state in immigration . . . and refugee . .. policy making." SASKIA SASSEN,
GUESTS AND ALIENS 156 (1999).
112. Ali, 213 F.R.D. 390, at 411.
113. See Curt Brown, Advocate pleads not guilty in immigration fraud case, STAR
TRIB., May 1, 2003, at 3B. Jamal is charged with six felony counts based on filing
false immigration information. Id. He is accused of failing to disclose information
about his asylee status in Canada when he applied for refugee status in the United
States. Id.
114. Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F. 3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 2003).
115. On February 23, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
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Our interviews indicated that many East African
immigrants, especially Somalis, were well informed about the
deportation proceedings. Both Jama and Jamal are well known in
the local Somali community.11 6  A number of immigrants
expressed keen interest in the final outcome of their cases.117
Even with substantial knowledge, however, most of the
immigrants we spoke with thought the circumstances under which
a person could be deported were broad and arbitrary. As the
Somali woman's quote above suggests, some immigrants believed
they could be deported for any misconduct, even a parking ticket.
There was a general perception that deportation occurs
unpredictably and indiscriminately. For example, one Oromo man
stated that "[i]f you do anything, if you do some crime, or stealing,
fight, you gonna be deported if you do not have citizenship."'
118
This reflects some immigrants' general perception that they are
subject to the whims of law-that the law operates outside their
control or expectations.
Members of the East African community in the Twin Cities
are dealing with their fear of deportation in two ways. The first is
to keep a low profile. 119 For example, one Somali man explained
how the immigrants would like to advocate on behalf of their home
countries, but they fear such advocacy would be interpreted as
finger-pointing or anti-American. He concluded:
Because of [September 11th], it is very difficult for them ....
Some people, if they want to show their sorrows and
hurtfulness of what is happening or [in response to] the media
[coverage], they are afraid if they do, they will be deported
back or get arrested or somehow [get] tortured. So they don't
even want to show or express their feelings. 120
A number of people were critical of Omar Jamal's
outspokenness, indicating that he did not speak for the Somali
community at large and fearing he would bring too much negative
attention to the Somali community.' 2' A social service provider at
the West Seventh Community Center, a family counseling center
in St. Paul, indicated that although most immigrants have legal
in Jama's case. INS, No. 03-674, 2004 WL 323175 (2004).
116. Interview 704, supra note 106.
117. Interview 032, supra note 107; Interview 046, supra note 107; Interview
311, supra note 103.
118. Interview 003, supra note 53.
119. Interview 317 by Ahmed Ali with 25-year-old Somali man, elementary
school, citizen, in Minneapolis, Minn. (July 24, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 317].
120. Interview 317, supra note 119.
121. Interview 703 with 28-year-old Somali man, some college, citizen, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 703].
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status, they are afraid that if they make one mistake they will be
deported.122 In general, we found that immigrants on temporary
visas, such as students, were more motivated to keep silent after
the declaration of a war on terror for fear of deportation than more
permanent immigrants.123 Individuals with little or no education
also indicated an unwillingness to speak out politically, although
for this group, the unwillingness seems to predate September 11,
2001.124 When asked what "political participation" meant to her,
one Somali woman said, "I am not involved in politics and I hate
it."125
Fortunately, a few individuals, including highly educated
Somalis, were not discouraged by a perceived risk of deportation
and indicated their interest in speaking out politically.1 26  For
example, a 22-year-old female Somali college student stated:
I am not excusing anything. But I believe the main thing why
September 11th occurred was because of U.S. foreign policy
towards the Middle East and towards African people. I mean,
the U.S. preaches democracy but outside of the American
walls, they are imperialist, they are dictators and what they
do itself is so savage that people could not take it [any] more..
So, after September 11th, I read a lot. I was actually part of
the Students Against the War. I went to their meetings and
like that.127
In sum, fear of deportation did not silence all of the
immigrants, even within the Somali community, which has been
most affected by the forced removals.
C. East African Immigrants Seek Citizenship to Gain Legal
Protections and Avoid Deportation.
The second response to fear of deportation was more uniform
among the various East African immigrant communities: fear led
122. Interview 402 by Sadie Pendaz with West Seventh Community Center
social service provider, in Minneapolis, Minn. (July 29, 2003) [hereinafter Interview
402].
123. Interview 019 with 30-year-old Tanzanian woman, B.S., student visa, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Apr. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 019]; Interview 014 with
27-year-old Tanzanian woman, M.A., permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn.
(Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 014].
124. Interview 305 by Ahmed Ali with 66-year-old Somali woman, no formal
education, permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Jan. 7, 2003) [hereinafter
Interview 305]; Interview 306 by Ahmed Ali with 78-year-old Somali man, B.S.,
refugee, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Jan. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 306].
125. Interview 301 by Ahmed Ali with 66-year-old Eritrean woman, some college,
permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Interview
301].




more immigrants to seek citizenship.1 28  Not surprisingly, it
appears that this was especially true for the Somalis. As one
Somali woman explained, "[i]t is a little bit better to be a U.S.
citizen than to have permanent residence because, let us say, some
people when they commit some kind of crime, if they are U.S.
citizen[s] they don't get deported back." 129  Many Somali men
talked about citizenship specifically in the context of deportation.
For example, this 28-year-old Somali doctor stated:
I think there are a lot of advantages of being a U.S. citizen.
And I think the biggest one is legal protection to some extent.
If you run into any trouble, it's easier to be a U.S. citizen than
not be a U.S. citizen. Ten Somalis were just deported about a
month ago, uh, for minor crimes they committed in the United
States. They would not have been deported for those minor
crimes if they were citizens . . . . They were permanent
residents . . . so there's a lot of security that comes with [being
a United States citizen]. 13 °
Other immigrants indicated that either they or their families
began to consider becoming American citizens only after
September 11th. One 45-year-old Kenyan student explained, "I
haven't looked at [trying to obtain citizenship] in detail because I
have not been interested in it. Experiences in the past, I mean.
Now [it] is different with this Somali thing coming and, and the
terrorism."'131 A 19-year-old Eritrean woman also related:
I have family members who were permanent residents for, you
know, five, six, ten years and they never thought to become
citizens . . . not that they didn't want to, but they didn't take
that extra step. But now, after September l1th, there are a lot
of things that are changing, and a lot of thing are more strict
and . . . you know, I've . . . around maybe four, five family
members that just became citizens, have applied for
citizenship now because it's more useful.1 2
Thus, the fear of deportation associated with the war on
terror has encouraged more immigrants to declare their formal
128. Interview 017 with 45-year-old Kenyan man, M.A., student, in Minneapolis,
Minn. (Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 017]; Interview 104, supra note 102.
Christian Joppke argued that immigrants in Western countries are increasingly
able to obtain citizenship while maintaining their unique cultural identities. See
generally Christian Joppke, How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A
Comparative View, 22 ETHNIC & RAciAL STUD. 646 (1999). On the other hand, the
perceived uniqueness of immigrants often prevents them from being fully accepted
in their adopted countries. See id.
129. Interview 051 with 28-year-old Somali woman, A.A., permanent resident, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 051].
130. Interview 020, supra note 29.
131. Interview 017, supra note 128.
132. Interview 104, supra note 102.
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loyalty to the United States. In general, the immigrants did not
call for new limits on deportation or greater clarification of the
law. Nor did they believe they could tailor their actions to avoid
violating the new deportation laws. Instead, most sought to
eliminate uncertainty by becoming U.S. citizens.
IV. Immigration Processing Slows Down at a Crucial Time
for Citizenship and Family Reunification
Along with increased deportations, immigrants we spoke
with noticed the increasing difficulty of navigating the
bureaucracy of U.S. immigration law.133 This aspect of the war on
terror affected the immigrants in two ways. First, it hindered
family reunification.1 34 Second, bureaucratic slowdowns impeded
immigrants' ability to adjust their status, to travel, or to become
citizens. 135
The immediate effect of the war on terror was to halt the flow
of new refugees into the United States. After September 11, 2001,
the American refugee resettlement program was shut down for
nearly three months while officials conducted a security review of
the program.136 Officials informed 22,000 immigrants who had
already been approved for immigration to the United States that
their admission into the country had been delayed indefinitely. 137
This occurred despite the fact that none of the September 11th
terrorists were refugees and that all of the refugees who had been
cleared for admission to the United States had met their burden of
demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution in their home
countries. 138
When the refugee resettlement program resumed operations
on December 11, 2001, the number of individuals allowed into the
United States was significantly scaled back. In the twenty years
prior to 2001, the United States had allowed an average of about
90,000 refugees a year to resettle within its borders. 139 Although
133. Interview 007, supra note 52; Interview 005 with 24-year-old Oromo
woman, B.A., asylee, in St. Paul, Minn. (Nov. 01, 2001) [hereinafter Interview 005].
134. See infra text accompanying notes 136-146.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 148-162.
136. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HuM. RTS., A YEAR OF Loss: RE-EXAMINING CIVL
LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 13 (2002), available at
http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/lossreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. See also LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL:




President Bush approved entry for up to 70,000 refugees for fiscal
year 2001-02, only 27,508 were actually admitted into the United
States in that year. 140 President Bush once again approved entry
for up to 70,000 refugees in fiscal year 2002-03,141 but the
administration allocated only enough staff and resources to
resettle at most 50,000 refugees in that year. 142 As it turned out,
even that number was extremely optimistic. As of August 2003
(for the fiscal year ending in September) only 26,317 refugees had
been resettled in the United States.143 Locally, Thomas Kosel,
Resettlement Director of the Migration & Refugee Program at
Catholic Social Services in St. Paul, noted in June 2002 that the
steady stream of Somali refugees arriving in the Twin Cities had
dwindled to a trickle. 144
The initial halt and subsequent slowdown in admissions
dramatically affected the ability of East African refugees to
reunite with their families. Many East Africans mentioned this
hardship. For example, one Somali woman was granted asylum
during a 1999 visit to the United States and had been struggling
since that time to get her husband and children into the
country. 145 She was concerned that the terrorist attack would
postpone her family's reunification indefinitely:
After September lth, I think the interview process has
stopped and all the people who were about to come cannot
come, and I do not know how long it will take them to start
interviewing again, and if you were behind in the schedule
then you have to wait longer. So we do not know how long it
will be.
F.S.: How long ago did you start the process?
As soon as I came, and it is about three years now. Last July
was the time they were going to interview them and now I do
not know. 146
A worker at Catholic Charities noted another example of the
problems with family reunification after September lth:
An elderly woman was here yesterday and we had requested
her INS file because JVA had closed the case of one of her
visited Feb.7, 2004) [Hereinafter ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL].




144. Scott Calvert, Somalis Find a New Home, New Struggles in Minnesota:
Sept. 11 and Local Violence Rouse Budding Community, BALT. SUN, June 2, 2002,
at 1A.




daughters, who didn't come with the rest of the family because
she was pregnant .... [Hier case was closed after 9/11 and all
this background security checking started up. . . . [T]he
daughter's file was sent to Washington. They checked on the
mother's file and this daughter's name wasn't in the mother's
file, nor was another daughter who had already arrived. The
reason, I believe, was because the guy ran out of lines when he
was writing down her children's names. There were six lines
[and] there are six names, [but] she had eight children. 47
Thus, the initial effect of the war on terror was to delay or
even halt family reunification among East African refugees and
asylees in the Twin Cities.
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
scrutinizes immigrants more closely than the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service. 148 However, despite the increased
responsibilities, resources have not correspondingly increased.
149
As a result, the bureaucracy is operating more slowly than it has
in the past.1 50 One Eritrean woman explained the way she saw
things:
But a lot of things did change after September l1th . . . and
immigration is really taking long ... you know, the processes
got a lot longer after September 11th, so [it] . . . has a really
big effect on a lot of. .. people. 15 1
The slowdown in the bureaucracy combined with the increase
in deportations keeps many immigrants in a constant state of
uncertainty. Just as the Justice Department appears to be
increasing its use of immigration violations to detain or deport
individuals they consider threatening, 52 the number of those
violations is likely increasing because of difficulties dealing with
the bureaucracy.' 53 In other words, more individuals may find
themselves out of status, not because they are irresponsible, but
because of shortcomings in the administration of their papers. For
example, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights related the
case of Mohammad Sarfaraz Hussain, an 18-year-old high school
student from Pakistan who had lived in the United States since he
147. Interview 406, supra note 39.
148. See, e.g., ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 139, at 37-38.
149. Id. at 45. See also Jean Hopfensperger, Immigrants feel wind of change: The
U.S. war on terrorism has sparked changes in immigration policy and procedures
that are unfolding in a number of ways, STAR TRIB., Nov. 21, 2001, at lB.
150. ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 140, at 45.
151. Interview 104, supra note 132.
152. ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 140, at 34 (stating that of the over
1200 immigrants detained after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the vast
majority were held for being out of status).
153. See id. at 37.
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was eight.15 4 Hussain was put in removal proceedings when he
tried to fulfill his call-in registration requirement even though he
had appropriately filed an application for a green card over a year
earlier. 155 The bureaucratic backlog, and not misconduct on
Hussain's part, led to his being out of status. 156  Only the
intervention of a U.S. Congressman kept Hussain from being
deported. 157
Among the immigrants with whom we spoke, some were out
of status. 158 Others, who were permanent residents or citizens,
declined with some discomfort to explain how they had attained
that status.15 9 In general, the immigrants we spoke with were
generally not comfortable relating the details of their immigration
status to us. As one Tanzanian man, for example, explained:
I know more Tanzanians are scared, some Tanzanians who
might be out of status are more scared that they might be
found. So there's more of that tension. Of course, these are
Tanzanians who are working and they're contributing to the
economy of Minnesota. They are paying their taxes. But they
are living in fear much more than before. 160
Social service providers we talked to also confirm that this
discomfort is widespread. 161 In this context, the enforcement of
the law creates ambiguity between who is "legal" and who is
"illegal." As regards immigrants who do not have complete control
over their status-the government itself can place them out of
status simply through its inefficiency. 162 Once again, immigration
law is an impediment operating outside the influence of those most
affected by it. This impotency marginalizes immigrant groups,
particularly those on temporary visas such as students. Thus, the
close connection between bureaucratic uncertainty and the fear of






158. Because of the exceptionally sensitive nature of this information, it was not
preserved in the transcripts.
159. Interview 107 with 35-year-old Ethiopian woman, M.A., permanent
resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (July 24, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 107].
160. Interview 014 with 27-year-old Tanzanian woman, M.A., permanent
resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 014].
161. Interview 402, supra note 122.
162. Calavita, supra note 8, at 548, has argued that similar bureaucratic "catch-
22s" in Spain are intentionally designed to marginalize immigrant groups.
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V. Immigrants are the Targets of State and Private
Discrimination after September 11th
Another issue related to the war on terror that concerned
East Africans was their impression that state and private actors
were discriminating against them. 163  Not surprisingly, this
impression made many of the immigrants we interviewed feel that
U.S. laws were working against them and operating outside their
control. In some instances, the targeting occurred through formal
state policies or in interactions with state officials. In other
instances, targeting came from private individuals, but
immigrants expressed surprise and dismay at the lack of state
censure of the private actions. A Kenyan woman expressed the
problem this way:
Americans are racists and I could see it clearly after
September 11th-the racist remarks in the name of
patriotism. Some of these remarks were suppressed but after
September 11th, I could not believe what people were doing
and saying about people of other cultures. I could not believe
the way poor Arabs, Somali, or any Arab-looking person was
treated after September 11th. 164
Many immigrants felt state protection was generally inadequate
against prejudice emerging out of the war on terror.
Two months after the terrorist attacks, the FBI closed all of
the Somali wire services in the Twin Cities. 165 Crackdowns on
these services affected immigrants' ties to their families and
friends around the world.166 Since the mid-1990s, Somalis in
Minnesota sent two to four million dollars per month to the Horn
of Africa. 167 Somali remittances were considerably more organized
and substantial than the remittances of other immigrant
groups. 168  Some Somalis felt community pressure to donate;
others cited religious obligation as the basis for their
163. Victor C. Romero, Decoupling "Terrorist" from "Immigrant:" An Enhanced
Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201, 205 (2003)
(stating that the vast majority of immigrants never commit any crime, and many
terrorists apprehended in the United States in recent years are not immigrants).
See also Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Law: Citizenship
and Race After September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871, 875-76 (2003).
164. Interview 016 with 55-year-old Kenyan woman, Ph.D., permanent resident,
in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 016].
165. Joy Powell, Raids anger Minnesota Somalis: They deny terrorism links and
worry about how to send money to poor relatives, STAR TRIB., Nov. 8, 2001, at Al.
166. Id.
167. David Phelps et al., Somalis funnel millions to E. Africa: Minnesota
immigrants have supported relatives left behind, but U.S. agencies are investigating





Local police began to investigate these wire transfers before
the terrorist attacks, in early 1999.170 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
the Internal Revenue Service also scrutinized the activities of the
wiring services. 171 By November 2000, the authorities agreed that
although much of the money went directly to support relatives,
some of the money was used to fund military supplies for warlords
and terrorists. 172  Estimates suggest that approximately five
percent of the money sent to Somalia from family members living
abroad supported terrorism. 173
One Somali man explained how the money transfer agencies
worked and how their closure affected the Somali community:
They closed two of the largest [money wiring businesses] and
it . . . had a huge impact on the Somali community, because
Somalia doesn't have a central government and there isn't a
central banking system. So those two institutions basically
served as banks for Somalians. You could send one hundred
dollars from here today and have your mother pick it up in
four hours. And it was based entirely on trust. And this is
something that has existed in the Muslim world . . . since
medieval times, based on trust .... So they closed, shut down
these two companies. It could entirely cloud the economy of
Somalia. You can go to the United Nations website . . . the
United Nations is very angry about it, about what the United
States government has done in that respect. Because it
crippled an already crippled country. Again, it affected the
people here because they can't remit money to their families
abroad.174
Later, he acknowledged that the smaller companies that re-opened
after the FBI intervention provided some relief for these problems
although he felt they are not as effective as the larger services. 175
Several other immigrants interviewed also mentioned the
hardship incurred as a result of the wire service closings.
New changes in Minnesota Department of Public Safety
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only issued to legal immigrants with valid visas. 177 The initial
purpose of the policy was to keep illegal immigrants from receiving
state benefits. 178 After the terrorist attacks, support for the policy
increased as lawmakers imagined that it might also increase state
security.179 Charlie Weaver, former Minnesota Public Safety
Commissioner, explicitly connected immigration with terrorism in
his reasons for supporting the bill: "[t]hey're from the countries
that attacked us on Sept. 11 and that hate us for our freedoms...
A driver's license is a gateway to guns, airplanes, pilot schools,
checking accounts and credit cards."18 0 Legislators debated, but
ultimately rejected, putting special markings on licenses of
immigrants.181  Nevertheless, the Public Safety Commission
enacted the provisions through emergency rulemaking in July
2002.182
Representatives of numerous communities, such as Jewish
Community Action and leaders of the Mexican-American and
Somali communities, challenged the new requirements, arguing
that distinctive features on legal immigrant drivers' licenses would
signal their status to law enforcement officers and make it harder
for immigrants to rent apartments or obtain social services. 183
While the Minnesota Court of Appeals overturned some provisions
of the policy, inclusion of visa status on foreign visitors' drivers'
licenses remains.18 4
Racial, ethnic, and religious profiling in airports was also of
great concern to many immigrants we interviewed.18 5  For
example, a Tanzanian woman related the story of a cousin who
was denied entry into the United States after September 11th.18 6
177. MINN. R. 7410.0410(6), 7410.0410 (7), 7410.0410 (8) (2004).
178. Padilla, supra note 164.
179. Conrad de Fiebre, Immigrants oppose security proposal: Plan to tighten
licensing process is too sweeping, opponents say, STAR TRIB., Feb. 16, 2002, at B5.
180. Id.
181. Conrad de Fiebre, A vehicle for information: Data on driver's licenses extend
far beyond road, STAR TRIB., Mar. 9, 2003, at Al.
182. Id. See also Lourdes Medrano Leslie, State's new rules go on smooth first
ride: But the tighter restrictions on getting a driver's license or an ID card, meant to
deter terrorists, worry immigrants, STAR TRIB., July 9, 2002, at B3; MINN. R.
7410.0400, 7410.0410 (2004).
183. Kevin Duchschere, Immigrants weigh in on anti-terrorism bill, STAR TRIB.,
Apr. 24, 2002, at B5.
184. David Phelps, Some driver's license provisions overturned: But the
Minnesota Appeals Court ruling did not cover inclusion of visa status on foreign
visitors'IDs, STAR TRIB., Mar. 12, 2003, at B3.
185. See Motomura, supra note 93, at 415 (suggesting that profiling is wrong
because it humiliates affected groups and sends a message of exclusion to them).
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The cousin's wife attended school in the United States, and the
cousin came to visit her. He planned to return to Tanzania with
their young child after staying in the country for a month. He
became a suspect of the authorities at the Atlanta airport because
he was an airplane pilot in Tanzania and had flown for Arab
airlines. The authorities detained him for two days. The
interview subject explained:
[T]hey said, you know, they wouldn't let him enter, and ... he
can stay and continue being detained .... And he started
begging to go back home after a while. Of course, he's
terrified. He's never experienced anything like it. So he's,
like, just send me home .... So after two days, they did send
him back home. So we were happy that he was safe, but it
was disgusting what happened because he was coming to see
his wife and he wasn't even able to pick up his poor kid .... 1 s 7
No one at the airport would give this man's wife, a non-U.S.
citizen, any information about his detention.1 88 However, when
the interviewee's American husband called, "they gave him all
kinds of information that they didn't give the wife."'1 9 The woman
concluded her story by relating the fear that "things we do that are
completely innocent are being perceived as terrorist."190 She also
noted that even "innocent people visiting family" can be labeled as
terrorists. 191 Other interview subjects also mentioned profiling in
airports, 192 and Ahmed Ali, one member of this Article's project
team, was detained briefly at an airport while the authorities
investigated a bottle of perfume in his suitcase. Instances such as
these bolster the perception that anti-terrorism laws are being
enforced indiscriminately against all immigrants.
Interactions with local police also contributed to a sense that
the Somali community was being targeted by discrimination. In
March 2002, police officers shot and killed Abu Jeilani, a 27-year-
old mentally-ill immigrant.1 93 Jeilani had come to the United
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Kenya. 194 He was married and had two young children. 195 When
police encountered Jeilani, he was carrying a machete and a
crowbar down a Minneapolis street and calling out "God is Great"
in Somali.' 96 Police officer Todd Gross, who did not initially notice
the machete, pulled up alongside Jeilani and asked to have a
conversation. 97  At that point, Jeilani began waving the
machete. 198 Gross called for a Crisis Intervention Team officer and
began to follow Jeilani. 199 The Crisis Intervention Team arrived
six minutes later.200 The officers attempted to subdue Jeilani
using a Taser gun, which delivers an electrical charge designed to
immobilize a person for several seconds. 20' The Taser gun proved
ineffective. 20 2 The officers continued to follow Jeilani for two
blocks until squad cars surrounded him. 203 An officer again fired a
Taser at Jeilani several times, to no effect. 204 Then the officers
fired thirteen shots, hitting Jeilani twelve times.205  The
interaction with police lasted a total of eleven minutes.206 Three
months later, the police officers involved in the shooting were
cleared of wrongdoing by a grand jury.20 7
The fatal shooting was denounced by leaders of several
Somali organizations. 208  They called for an independent
investigation and for the resignation of the police chief.20 9 Many
expressed the sentiment that the police should have done more to
defuse the crisis. 210 In the days following the shooting, there were
several large protests. 211 One interview subject voiced the familiar
194. Lourdes Medrano Leslie, Grieving family, friends struggle to understand,
STAR TRIB., Mar. 12, 2002, at A8.
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theme that legal authorities acted indiscriminately in the Jeilani
shooting:
I was touched when that happened because I don't like such
thing happening to [a] human being and not just because he
was Somali but a human being who did not bother anyone and
[who was] mentally ill. They get him by sixteen bullets. It is
something that is unacceptable, you know. Of course I went
there and I showed that I am among those who are not happy
about what happened.2 12
A group of angry Somali women marched to Minneapolis
Mayor R.T. Rybak's office to protest the shooting, 21 3 and Rybak
met with members of Somali community several times. 214 Some of
our interview subjects used the Jeilani case to explain why they
felt that the police did not treat them fairly because they were
Black, Muslim, or immigrants. 215  East African immigrants,
particularly Somalis, mobilized politically to protest the shooting.
This contrasts with their lack of political mobilization in the areas
of overbroad bases for deportation and the failure of family
reunification. The different reactions may be explained by the fact
that acquiring citizenship does not eliminate the risk of targeting
by police but it is perceived as eliminating the risk of deportation
and improving chances of family reunification.
Many of the immigrants we spoke to perceived the Jeilani
tragedy as state discrimination against them.216 Of equal concern
to recent immigrants was the sense that the police were not
protecting them from targeting by private individuals who unfairly
blamed all Muslims and immigrants for the terrorist attacks. East
Africans were physically threatened and beaten in the months
following the terrorist attacks, and this was a major concern
within the community. 217  One Somali woman described a
harrowing experience:
I was, the person speaking to you, two days after September
11th at Lake Street when a Black American man driving a car
wanted to hit us right in the middle of the street-the car my
friend and I were in. "Bullshit Islam! You stinking Muslims
that burn our buildings and our country!" Thank God, God
marchers: Police overreacted in killing Somali man, speakers say, STAR TRIB., Mar.
24, 2002, at B8.
212. Interview 317, supra note 119.
213. Estrada, supra note 211, at B1.
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216. See, e.g., Interview 100 with 25-year-old Sudanese man, high school, citizen,
in Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov. 27, 2002).
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brought us people, otherwise he wanted to kill us right
there.21
s
We were told by an interviewee that other women wearing the
hijab in the days after the terrorist attack also reported being
harassed and assaulted. 219
In addition, stores owned by immigrants were defaced in the
months following September 11th. For example, in June of 2002,
an Ethiopian man explained to Fortunata Songora how his
business had been firebombed the day before his interview:
Let me tell you, yesterday after you left, you know, you see
this, [he shows me different signs of burns in the store and I
realize they were not there the two times I was there before]
this fire over here, over there. [We are now walking around
the store and he is showing me all the burns in the store]. Let
me show you these are the burns ... so you see these ones [he
shows me some little firebombs-mmh, I'm scared a bit]. So
when you left, my friends were sitting here and I'm wiring
money through Western Union and somebody throw the
firebomb from the door. 220
The Ethiopian man went on to explain that Americans
cannot distinguish between Arabs and Africans, implying that
Americans think both groups are terrorists. 22 1 The man also
complained that it took the police two hours to respond to his
emergency call.222
Like this Ethiopian man, a number of our interviewees felt
that the police lacked sensitivity to their situation. This problem
was exemplified in a case involving one of the most serious attacks
on an immigrant. Somali elder Ali W. Ali was assaulted at a bus
stop one month after the terrorist attacks. 223 Ali was punched in
the face, which apparently caused him to fall and strike his head
on the pavement.224 He died several days later.225 The hospital
where Ali was treated initially announced to the press that Ali had
218. Interview 043 by Idil Mohamed with 45-year-old Somali woman, A.A.,
permanent resident, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sep. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Interview
043].
219. Interview 021 with 34-year-old Oromo man, B.A., work permit, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Interview 021]. See also Calvert,
supra note 144.
220. Interview 021, supra note 219.
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223. Kavita Kumar, Somalis, Muslims denounce paper's story: A Star Tribune
article said investigators think some Somalis gave funds to a group linked to Bin
Laden, STAR TRIB., Oct. 10, 2001, at B2.
224. Id.
225. David Chanen, Man assaulted at bus stop dies, STAR TRIB., Oct. 25, 2001, at
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died of natural causes. 226 On January 9th, nearly three months
after the assault, they changed their assessment, and attributed
Ali's death to the head injuries he suffered in the assault.227 Upon
hearing the news that the death had been ruled a homicide, one
family friend noted, "[i]t's like telling you that you have two feet.
You knew it. You knew it all the time."228
The attack occurred on October 14, 2001, the same day that
the Star Tribune reported that Somalis had been inadvertently
wiring money to Al Qaida.229 The timing of the assault led many
in the Somali community to blame the article for the attack.230
Both the crime and its official handling rankled some in the local
Somali community. Police initially resisted the idea that the man
was a victim of a hate crime. 231 Apparently, in an interview at the
hospital, the dying man had led the police to believe he had been
hit by a car driven by a Somali. 232 Later, the police acknowledged
that Ali's medical condition made it difficult for him to give a clear
explanation of the assault. 233 Early on, the police claimed to be
frustrated by a lack of evidence and witnesses. 234 They made a
request for any witnesses to come forward.235 Later, it appeared
that the police had interviewed witnesses at the scene of the
crime, but had not believed those witnesses would be very
helpful.236
For example, when police arrived at the crime scene, they
discovered that a group across the street had witnessed the
attack. 237 Police reported that one of the witnesses claimed a
226. David Chanen, Bus stop assault is ruled homicide: Somali victim's family
maintains it was hate crime, STAR TRIB., Jan. 9, 2002, at Bi [hereinafter Bus stop
assault is ruled homicide].
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White man had hit Ali in the face.238 The police enlisted the aid of
someone to translate because most of the group spoke only
Spanish.239  The Hispanic men indicated that the male
perpetrator, who was White, had threatened them first and then
moved on to the Somali man.240 In addition, Reverend Larry
Wesley, the associate pastor of Total Victory Christian Center,
witnessed the assault from the dining room window of a Catholic
Charities homeless shelter where he was working as an outreach
counselor. 24 1 Wesley saw the man approach All, circle him, and
then punch him.242 Wesley described the perpetrator as a White
male with short blond hair, in his twenties, about five feet, eleven
inches tall, approximately 200 pounds, and wearing a hat and
dark clothes. 243 Minneapolis police found this description too
generic to be very useful.244
While the police have maintained that there is not enough
evidence to characterize the assault as a hate crime, several of our
interview subjects had a different opinion. One interviewee, for
example, stated:
Hate crime, you know, hate crimes. We see it in Minneapolis,
a lot of incidents since September lth, because a lot of, two,
three, women, they harassed . . . and one old guy, like sixty-
three years old ... somebody hit [him] and he died. So they
damaged his head, so.245
The police position did not change after Ali's death was ruled
a homicide in January 2002.246 The police continues to maintain
that the circumstances of Ali's death were unclear. 247  The
perpetrator was never apprehended. 248 The handling of the Ali
murder raised the level of distrust between the Somalis and the
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Prejudice and violence against immigrants predated the
terrorist attacks. Several East African cab drivers have been
murdered in the Twin Cities, both before and after the terrorist
attacks. 249 A number of East Africans mentioned that Americans
(both Black and White) were unwilling to sit next to them on buses
because Americans thought they smelled. 250 However, the sting of
informal religious and racial bigotry became more pronounced in
the post-September 11th environment. 251 While many of the
immigrants sensed discrimination prior to the war on terror, it is
clear that they felt they were under heightened scrutiny after the
terrorist attacks. One Somali woman articulated the change that
she perceived:
When I speak the truth, before September 11th, I did not see
that much problem. After September 11th, when it was said
the people who did the attack were Muslims, it caused many
people problems in America. 252
Another Somali woman was frustrated by what she perceived
as the indiscriminate application of the terrorist label:
We are very sorry for what happened on September 11th-
something unimaginable happened that day. We are suffering
the pain, but at the same we are treated bad. People talk
about us in the bus-the way we are dressing and they think
we are terrorists. We came here in America because we
wanted peace. All of a sudden everything in America we are
not against, but we are treated like we are against America,
and I think to a large extent we are treated that way because
we are Muslims. 253
The war on terror increased the discriminatory targeting of
recent immigrant communities. It appears that over time, many
in the East African community became distrustful that legal
authorities would intervene to protect them from discrimination,
and some immigrants even felt that the police were actively
operating against their community.
Fortunately, the Minneapolis Police has attempted to close
the rift between its officers and East Africans. Around the time
249. Id.
250. Interview 705, supra note 70; Interview 041 by Idil Mohamed with 45-year-
old Somali woman, B.A., asylee, translated from Somali, in St. Paul, Minn. (Sept.
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251. Some Somalis feared that the release of the movie Black Hawk Down would
cause Americans to see Somalis as anti-American, and commented that Somalis
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the officers were cleared of wrongdoing in the Jeilani shooting,
police chief Robert Olson met with members of the immigrant
community and assured them that they could trust local police.
254
The local police were not immigration police, he stated-they were
not looking to determine the legal status of members of the
immigrant community. 255  It is not clear that the typical
immigrant makes this distinction. Furthermore, recent legal
developments have or will change the role of local police in
enforcing immigration laws. For example, because of the new
Minnesota regulations regarding immigrant drivers' licenses, local
police now have to deal with expired visas when they check
drivers' licenses after traffic violations. 256 Furthermore, federal
legislation pending in the House of Representatives at the time of
this writing would change local police responsibilities by giving
them authority over immigration matters.257
Many of the East African immigrants we interviewed
perceive that they are being targeted because of their appearance
or religion. At best, they see legal authorities, such as the police,
as ineffective at protecting them from that targeting; at worst,
they perceive legal authorities themselves engaged in
discrimination. Exacerbating this uncertainty, state and federal
laws are changing the local police role in the war on terror. 258
That role must clearly be defined and conveyed to the immigrant
communities.
Conclusion
Because of the U.S. public's belief in the necessity of the war
on terror, widespread deportations, bureaucratic slowdowns, and
racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination against East African
immigrants and refugees are viewed as acceptable, if somewhat
regrettable, by-products of the war on terror. Lawmakers
technically distinguish the war on terror from the mistreatment of
immigrants. They rhetorically suggest that "good" immigrants
have nothing to fear from their policies. But these distinctions get
lost in the enactment of law and, consequently, in immigrants'
254. The Minneapolis Police have a policy of not asking questions about
immigration unless specifically requested by federal authorities. See Jackie
Crosby, Minneapolis chief, mayor vow to work with city's Somalis: Police issues
raised at community forum, STAR TRIB., June 7, 2002, at B3.
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perceptions of the law.
Our interviews suggest that most East African immigrants in
the Twin Cities believe that U.S. immigration and anti-terrorism
laws are indiscriminate and operate against them-even when
they have no connections whatsoever to terrorism. In general,
many interview subjects shared this Somali woman's assessment
that the U.S. legal system was indiscriminate in its apprehension
of immigrants:
We can't be terrorists. We came here because we wanted
peace. We have adopted this country as our own .... How
can we then turn around and kill all other Americans? I wish
the Americans would have really looked into this thing and
seen who is terrorist and who is not, but now we Somalis are
all treated like terrorists. 25 9
Rhetorical differentiation between terrorists and immigrants, and
between "good" and "bad" immigrants, disappears in the
implementation of the war on terror.
Fortunately, several of the East African immigrants we spoke
with were politically active and informed. The war on terror did
not have a uniformly chilling effect on political mobilization.
However, the war on terror is unsettling many immigrants,
causing them to fear deportation, suffer a bureaucratic labyrinth,
and feel discriminated against by officials and lay people alike.
Some formal targeting such as profiling and license requirements
makes immigrants afraid to assert their rights under the law.
When this formal discrimination is coupled with the inability or
unwillingness of state officials to protect immigrants from private
violence and discrimination, the war on terror is targeting
immigrants.
We believe the most important task is to clarify the legal
mandate of the war on terror. This will minimize "collateral
damage" to immigrants who have done nothing to threaten the
safety of the country. First, policymakers should ensure that
immigration forms are processed quickly and clearly so that
bureaucratic slowdowns do not put family reunification and an
immigrant's overall legal status into jeopardy. Second,
policymakers should provide more counseling and education to
immigrant groups, in their native languages, to explain clearly
how to maintain legal status and how the government makes
decisions about detention and deportation. Third, the role of local
police in the enforcement of immigration laws must be clearly
defined and conveyed to the immigrant communities. In addition,
259. Interview 038, supra note 88.
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police must continue to take steps to reduce violent crime against
East Africans and publicize their efforts within those communities.
Fourth, policymakers should continue to work with immigrant
groups to fight against religious and racial discrimination of all
types. Finally, policymakers must understand how the
motivations and backgrounds of immigrants may keep them from
speaking out against certain policies that could be harmful in the
long run. Fundamentally, policymakers must work to reduce the
ambiguities and uncertainties that surround the war on terror.
By creating a bureaucratic system for immigration that is
reasonable, efficient, and transparent, the United States will allow
appreciative immigrants the opportunity to enter this country
without fear. Providing immigrants with the same legal
protections citizens enjoy will enhance trust among immigrant
communities, bureaucratic officials, and law enforcement. This
trust may bear fruit as immigrants become a part of U.S. society
and contribute to the ultimate goal of the war on terror: finding
and stopping terrorists.
